2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

9-19-2011

Dorothy Jackson v. J. Lewis Crozer Library

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

Recommended Citation
"Dorothy Jackson v. J. Lewis Crozer Library" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 515.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/515

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 10-4548
___________
DOROTHY JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
J. LEWIS CROZER LIBRARY; KATIE NEWELL

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-07-cv-00481)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 15, 2011
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 19, 2011)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Dorothy Jackson appeals from the judgment the District Court entered after a
bench trial on Jackson‟s disability discrimination claims against her employer, the J.

Lewis Crozer Library. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
I. Background
In her complaint filed with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Jackson asserted
claims for employment discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with
Disability Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et. seq. In accord with a stipulation the parties
entered and which the District Court approved, the case proceeded to a bench trial only
on the PHRA claims. Following the bench trial, the District Court issued an opinion and
judgment finding in favor of the Library and Newell. The District Court concluded that
Jackson was clearly disabled but that she had never requested an accommodation because
of her disability. Rather, Jackson had attempted to alter the terms of the full-time
children‟s librarian position because she wanted to continue home-schooling her son.
Thus, the court found that the Library did not terminate Jackson because of a refusal to
accommodate her disability. The court further concluded that Jackson‟s letter to the
board did not constitute opposition to unlawful discrimination and, as a result, determined
that her retaliation claim also lacked merit.
The bench trial revealed the following facts: Jackson began work as a part-time
children‟s librarian at the Library in April 1995. Jackson usually worked from 9.30 a.m.
to 1.30 p.m. and her main responsibilities included organizing the children‟s library,
overseeing children‟s programs, and engaging in outreach activities. Outside of her work
hours, Jackson home-schooled her son, David. Jackson‟s husband, Dr. Carl Jackson,
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shared responsibility with his wife for his son‟s schooling. In June 2003, David was
seventeen and had one remaining year of home-schooling.
When she was the part-time children‟s librarian, Jackson was diagnosed with
macular degeneration, which is “„a slow or sudden, painless loss of central visual
acuity.‟” As a result of her macular degeneration, Jackson became legally blind. Jackson
was unable to drive, and instead relied on her husband to transport her to and from work.
Jackson functioned as a librarian with the help of a magnifying device and library staff to
direct her to patrons who needed assistance. The Library also encouraged school groups
to travel to the library, as opposed to having Jackson travel to them.
In 2002, the Library hired Katherine Newell to be its new director. Jackson
continued to work as the part-time children‟s librarian during Newell‟s tenure. Over a
series of board meetings in the spring of 2003, Newell and the Library board of directors
decided that a full-time children‟s librarian would better serve the Library. The full-time
position would consist of a thirty-five hour work week, with some weekend and evening
hours, and required “coordinat[ing] interaction between local schools; including (but not
limited to) cooperative programs, library tours, school appearances.” The board
eventually authorized Newell to commence the hiring process for the position and
advised Newell of the ADA.
On June 26, 2003, Newell – who was aware of Jackson‟s macular degeneration –
approached Jackson and asked if the two could talk in Newell‟s office. There, Newell
told Jackson that the board had decided to turn the children‟s librarian job into a full-time
position, described the new position, offered the position to Jackson, and told Jackson to
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discuss the opportunity with her family. At the end of the conversation, as Jackson was
leaving the office, she told Newell that her only concern was that the home-schooling of
her son still required another year.
On July 1, 2003, Newell brought Jackson into her office and inquired whether
Jackson would accept the full-time position. Jackson expressed her interest but requested
a series of modifications to the position, most significantly that the position remain parttime. Newell, however, was not receptive to Jackson‟s suggestions. The conversation
became heated, and no agreement was reached.
Although Jackson had requested flexible hours, both Jackson and her husband
maintained that they could have altered their work and home-schooling schedules to
allow Jackson to assume the full-time position. Jackson and her husband acknowledged
that the full-time position would require altering the home-schooling of their son but
insisted that the change was achievable.
On July 4, 2003, Jackson sent a letter to two Library board members to address the
potential full-time position and possible modifications to the position. In the letter,
Jackson mentioned her macular degeneration and resulting inability to drive, as well as
ways to work around her disability and accommodate library outreach efforts, even
offering to pay a driver for this purpose out of her own pocket. Jackson went on to state
her preference for remaining part-time and proposed to be paid on an hourly basis, giving
up health insurance and paid vacation. In return, Jackson requested “the ability to have a
flexible schedule that would help alleviate the extra burden that would fall on [her]
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family due to [her] handicap.” Alternatively, Jackson proposed hiring a second, part-time
children‟s librarian. Newell received and read a copy of Jackson‟s letter.
In a letter sent July 15, 2003, Newell informed Jackson of her termination.
Jackson contacted a member of the board to protest her firing, and wrote a letter to the
same effect. In an October 3, 2003, letter to Jackson, John Nails, on behalf of the Library
Board, stated that the Board decided to abide by Newell‟s decision to terminate Jackson
and intended to take no further action regarding the matter.
II. Discussion1
Jackson contends that the District Court erred in its conclusion that she requested
to alter the terms of the library position because she wanted to continue home-schooling
her son, not to seek an accommodation on account of her disability. She further contends
that the court erred in concluding that her letter to the Library Board did not specifically
complain about disability discrimination, and could not establish retaliation.
A. Disability Discrimination
The ADA and the PHRA both prohibit certain entities from discriminating against
a disabled, otherwise qualified individual in the hiring or discharge of employees. See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a); 43 P.S. § 955(a). Under the ADA, an employer must reasonably
accommodate an employee‟s disabilities. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t,
1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1291. “On the appeal of a bench trial, we
review a district court‟s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de
novo.” McCutcheon v. Am. Serv. Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009). To address
Jackson‟s claims under the PHRA, we refer to our ADA caselaw. See Eshelman v. Agere
Sys. Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 433 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).
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380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004). Failure to engage in an interactive, good faith process
to determine if an accommodation for a disabled employee can be made amounts to
prohibited discrimination. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 311-12 (3d
Cir. 1999)). To establish that an employer breached its good faith duty to engage in this
interactive process, an employee is required to show, among other elements, that he or
she “requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability.” Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
In the present case, the District Court‟s conclusion that Jackson did not seek an
accommodation because of her disability is not clearly erroneous and requires the denial
of her discrimination claim. There is ample evidence to support the District Court‟s
finding that Jackson sought to alter the terms of the full-time position because of her
son‟s homeschooling, not her disability. The District Court thus properly concluded that
Jackson failed to request an accommodation on account of her disability and, in turn, that
she never triggered the library‟s duty to engage in the interactive process. See Colwell,
602 F.3d at 504.
B. Retaliation
Both the ADA and the PHRA prohibit retaliation against an employee. See 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a); 43 Pa Cons. Stat. § 955(d). In order to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, employees must show that their employer took adverse action against them
for engaging in a protected activity. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 759. Requesting an
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accommodation on account of a disability amounts to a protected activity. See Sulima v.
Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).
As we have explained, the District Court properly found as a matter of fact that
Jackson‟s letter sought to adjust her work arrangement to better suit the home-schooling
of her son, not on account of her disability.2 The District Court‟s well-supported factual
conclusion thus eliminates the only protected activity Jackson asserts as a basis for her
retaliation claim.3
III. Conclusion
For foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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The District Court also correctly concluded that Jackson‟s letter did not establish
that she was attempting to complain of discrimination.
3
Jackson does not appeal the District Court‟s dismissal of her aiding and abetting
claim under the PHRA against Newell.
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